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MAKING A CASE FOR WEALTH-
CALIBRATED PUNITIVE DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in the United States have struggled for many years to
find rational and workable ways in which to limit punitive damage
awards. A key issue considered by courts and lawmakers has been
the extent to which juries should be permitted to use the defendant's
wealth in deciding what punitive damages award would best achieve
the twin goals of punitive damages, punishment and deterrence. In
2003, the Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell', ending the debate about what role the
defendant's net worth would play in the punitive damages calculus.
Prior to the decision in State Farm, the doctrine of punitive
damages had been described as the "struggle of individuals to
preserve their rights against the mighty."2  Most courts allowed
jurors to consider the defendant's net worth in deciding what
punitive damages award would best achieve punishment and
deterrence.3 By holding that plaintiffs may not use the wealth of the
defendant, whether a corporation or individual, in arguing for a
higher punitive damages award, the Supreme Court, in State Farm,
undermined the ability of the civil system to punish and deter
misconduct and protect those unable to protect themselves.
1. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
2. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1269, 1285 (1993).
3. Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant's Wealth as
Factor in Determining Propriety of Award, 87 A.L.R.4th 141, 151 (1991)
("The vast majority of courts which have considered the issue of whether the
trier of fact may also consider the wealth of the defendant in fashioning a
punitive award have determined that the defendant's wealth is an appropriate
consideration because the degree of punishment or deterrence is to some extent
proportionate to the means of the wrongdoer."); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("In assessing punitive damages, the trier
of fact can properly consider the... wealth of the defendant").
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In State Farm, the Court foreclosed individuals' ability to
preserve their rights against wealthy defendants. The State Farm
Court severely limited the use of a defendant's wealth in the
calculation of punitive damages when it stated, "[t]he wealth of a
defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive
damages award.",
5
In a recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging, Inc., Judge Posner interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in State Farm as creating a narrow circumstance where the
wealth of the defendant would be relevant to the punitive damages
calculus. 6 According to Mathias, a wealth-calibrated punitive award
is appropriate when the defendant's conduct is highly reprehensible,
but the plaintiff's compensable harm is small or hard to quantify.7 In
this narrow circumstance, a substantial punitive award prevents a
wealthy defendant from profiting from its misconduct and
discouraging other litigants by outspending them.8 While Judge
Posner's opinion is well supported by the history and development of
punitive damages, it is entirely inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in State Farm.
Judge Posner's position, however, carries the weight of history
and hundreds of years of precedent. The State Farm Court was
wrong to preclude consideration of defendant's wealth in inflating a
punitive award. This Article will argue that contrary to State Farm,
the wealth of the defendant, as Judge Posner suggests, is relevant to
achieving the goals behind punitive damages: punishment and
deterrence. 9 Ignoring a defendant's wealth in the punitive damages
calculus allows many wealthy defendants to engage in misconduct
without the fear of punishment or the possibility of deterrence.
Part II of 'this Article reviews the history of punitive damages to
reveal that the wealth of the defendant has consistently been a factor
in the punitive damages determination. Part III examines the two
theories underlying punitive damages, punishment and deterrence.
4. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
5. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996)).
6. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.
2003).
7. Id. at 677.
8. Id.
9. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.
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Next, Part IV considers the Supreme Court's decisions shaping the
punitive damages analysis, culminating with State Farm. The
analysis in Part V establishes that the Supreme Court's decision in
State Farm is inconsistent both with the history and underlying
theories of punitive damages. In Part VI, this Article examines
Judge Posner's reasoning in Mathias to reveal that it is inconsistent
with State Farm. Part VII's discussion demonstrates that, while
inconsistent with State Farm, Mathias is consistent with the history
and theories of punitive damages. Finally, the Article concludes in
Part VIII that Mathias correctly identifies the need to consider the
wealth of the defendant if punishment and deterrence are to be
achieved and our civil system is to protect those unable to protect
themselves.
II. HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Beginnings of Punitive Damages
The doctrine of punitive damages has ancient lineage. 10 The use
of evidence of the defendant's wealth in the punitive damages
calculus is equally ancient." In Roman times, the statutory remedy
of multiple damages functioned in much the same way as punitive
damages; both provide for an award in excess of actual harm.'
2
These multiple damages blended compensation with punishment and
provided a necessary means to constrain the wealthy elite.'
3
Common law punitive damages originated in England in the
thirteenth century. 14  Just as Roman Senators might have paid
multiple damages when they oppressed private citizens, the wealthy
English elite paid punitive damages when they used their wealth and
power to oppress. 15 The eighteenth century companion cases of
10. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1285.
11. See id.
12. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §
1.1 (4th ed. 2000); see also KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2
(1980) (discussing the use of the statutory remedy of multiple damages in the
Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., in the Hittite Law in 1400 B.C., in the
Hindu Code of Manu in 200 B.C., and in the Bible).
13. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1286.
14. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 12, § 1.3(A).
15. Id.
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Wilkes v. Wood 16 and Huckle v. Money 17 exemplified the English
courts' employment of punitive damages to punish and deter the
misuse of wealth and power that threatened English social order.
18
The courts stated that exemplary damages not only served as a
satisfaction to the injured person, but also punished and deterred the
wealthy defendant. 19 As the eighteenth century came to a close, the
use of evidence of wealth in the punitive damages analysis was
firmly entrenched in the English tradition.
B. The Beginnings of Punitive Damages in the United States
The doctrine of punitive damages was exported to America
"'where it received widespread and substantial acceptance."' 20 By
the 1850s, the doctrine of punitive damages was well-settled and
American courts began to hold that punitive damages served a
separate function from compensation; they were necessary to punish
the offender and deter the offender and others from engaging in
similar conduct.2 1  American courts also followed the English
tradition of considering evidence of wealth as essential to
determining the amount of punitive damages necessary to punish and
deter each defendant.
22
16. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
17. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
18. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99. In the case of Wilkes v. Wood, the
King had Wilkes' house searched and seized property because Wilkes
published a pamphlet allegedly libelous to the King. The court held that small
compensatory damages would do nothing to stop the King from invading
Wilkes' civil rights and that punitive damages were necessary to punish the
defendant and deter future misconduct. Id. Huckle v. Money involved similar
though less outrageous conduct by the King's Secretary of State. Huckle, 95
Eng. Rep. at 768-69.
19. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
20. See Jill McKee Pohlman, Punitive Damages in the American Civil
Justice System: Jackpot or Justice?, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 613, 619 (quoting
THOMAS F. LAMBERT, JR., THE CASE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A NEW AUDIT
1 (1988)).
21. SCHUELTER & REDDEN, supra note 12, § 1.4(A).
22. See Schafer v. Ostmann, 155 S.W. 1102, 1104 (Mo. 1913) ("It was
proper to take into consideration [defendant's] financial condition in assessing
punitive damages against him."); Harman v. Cundiff, 82 Va. 239, 246 (1886)
("[I]n ascertaining the damages they shall consider.., the wealth of the
defendant.., so far as it tends to show the defendant's rank and influence in
society."); Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 85, 88 (1855) ("Upon this subject of
1742
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In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the
use of punitive damages expanded beyond just punishing wealthy
defendants for malicious acts to punishing wealthy corporations for
equally malicious acts. In 1870, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
observed, "when exemplary or punitory damages are to be given, the
[defendant's circumstances are] ... material. [S]ufficient dam-
ages... for a day laborer without means, would be nothing.., to a
wealthy corporation., 23  By the twentieth century, most courts
considered it "obviously proper that the wealth of the defendant
should be considered" on the question of punitive damages.24
C. Present Status in the United States
Indeed, until State Farm, the vast majority of courts had
determined that the defendant's wealth was an appropriate
consideration. In 1991, courts in forty-five states recognized that
evidence of the defendant's financial circumstances, although not
mandatory, was a relevant factor when assessing the correct amount
of punitive damages.25 Thirteen of those courts held that the trier of
fact must consider the wealth of the defendant in determining the
appropriate amount of punitive damages.26 Very few state courts
held that the wealth of the defendant could not be considered in
awarding punitive damages.27
Thus, courts consistently treated the defendant's wealth as a
relevant factor in the punitive damages analysis until the State Farm
decision. The main reason courts throughout history have allowed,
or at times required, consideration of a defendant's wealth was the
vindictive or exemplary damages... you may consider that the defendant is a
man of large property.").
23. Belknap v. Boston & Maine R.R., 49 N.H. 358, 358 (1870).
24. Flaacke v. Stratford, 64 A. 146, 147 (N.J. 1906).
25. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 4 (1991) (showing that Kentucky,
Michigan, Washington, and Nebraska are the only states that do not consider
the defendant's wealth relevant.).
26. Id. § 3 (showing that Alaska, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
and West Virginia all require that a defendant's wealth be considered.).
27. Id. § 6 (showing that Kentucky and Michigan courts do not allow the
wealth of the defendant to be considered by the finder of fact in arriving at its
award of punitive damages.).
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recognition that wealth-calibrated punitive damages are better able to
achieve punishment and deterrence.
2 8
D. When and Why Punitive Damages Are Awarded
Punitive damages are awarded in very few cases.29 In order for
a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must first
establish an underlying cause of action for which damages are
recoverable. 30 Courts only allow juries to award punitive damages in
cases involving highly reprehensible conduct.3 ' A defendant's
mental state is the basis for an award of punitive damages;32 if the
defendant acted maliciously, recklessly or oppressively, a court will
give jurors the discretion to determine "whether to make the award at
all, and... the amount of the award., 33 Generally plaintiffs must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that punitive damages are
appropriate, but some courts demand a higher standard of clear and
convincing evidence.
34
III. PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE: THE TWIN GOALS OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
A. Deterrence
It is well acknowledged that the most important goal of punitive
damages is deterrence-the prevention of similar misconduct in the
future.35 There are two types of deterrence: specific and general.36
Specific deterrence's goal is to teach the defendant not to engage in
misconduct again.37  General deterrence serves to prevent others
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. See Lori Woodward O'Connell, The Case for Continuing to Award
Punitive Damages, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 873, 884-86 (2001) (indicating that
studies done in the 1980's and 1990's revealed that punitive damages were
rarely awarded in all types of cases).
30. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 811 (2d ed.
1993); see SCHLUETER & REDDEN supra note 12, § 2.1 (A).
31. See DOBBS, supra note 30, at 810.
32. REDDEN, supra note 12, § 3.1(A).
33. DOBBS, supra note 30, at 811.
34. Id.
35. O'Connell, supra note 29, at 894-95.
36. Id. at 877.
37. Id.
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from following the defendant's example.38 Regardless of whether
the goal is specific or general deterrence or both, consideration of the
financial condition of the defendant is necessary. Neither the jury
nor the reviewing court will be able to properly determine the
amount of punitive damages that will effectively prevent the
wrongdoer's conduct and deter others from acting similarly if the
defendant's financial status is not available. "Different defendants
deserve different damages.,
39
Furthermore, if punitive damages are not calibrated for wealth,
then a plaintiff's ability to bring suit to deter a wealthy defendant
from engaging in misconduct will be very limited. First of all,
wealth-calibrated punitive damages enable certain plaintiffs to
pursue claims they might otherwise be unable to afford to pursue.4 °
Faced with expensive litigation and a relatively small compensatory
award, plaintiffs may in fact be deterred from suing for highly
reprehensible conduct, especially when the defendant is wealthy.4'
Moreover, even if a plaintiff can expect to recover a large amount of
compensatory damages, the cost of bringing suit may be
prohibitive.42
In addition, a defendant's wealth enables the defendant to make
bringing suit prohibitive. A wealthy defendant can mount an
"extremely aggressive defense," making litigation very costly for the
plaintiff involved while simultaneously establishing a reputation
aimed at deterring other plaintiffs from bringing suit.43 Without
wealth-calibrated punitive damages, plaintiffs faced with suing an
aggressive and wealthy defendant likely will choose not to pursue
their claim, since even if they win, they will not be made whole by
whatever award they receive.44 As a result, wealthy defendant's
malfeasance will go undeterred. Thus, wealth-calibrated punitive
38. Id.
39. Id. at 895; see also id. at 876-77.
40. See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions,
Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 378-79 (1994).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.
2003).
44. Owen, supra note 40, at 378-79; see also O'Connell, supra note 29, at
878 (discussing how punitive damages provide the plaintiff with extra
compensation).
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damages perform the important function of encouraging plaintiffs to
pursue their claims, resulting in more deterrence.45
Moreover, in the context of suits brought against corporations,
the financial status of the defendant is a key factor in the punitive
damages analysis because the enormous wealth of America's giant
corporations make punitive damages an ineffective deterrent unless
wealth can be considered.46 Deterrence through punitive damages
cannot be accomplished if a wealthy defendant can "'absorb [an]
award with little or no discomfort."' 7 "'Deterrence theory is based
on the.., assumption that actors weigh the expected costs and
benefits of their future actions."' 48  In the context of wealthy
corporations, the cost-benefit calculations, while rational from an
economic standpoint, may have devastating social costs for society.49
Thus, if financial status cannot be used to increase a punitive
damages award, then there exists no meaningful way to teach
corporations that "tort does not pay."
50
Finally, wealth-calibrated punitive damages are necessary to
deter corporate malfeasance where there are "gaps" in the criminal
law.51 Many serious misdeeds cannot be deterred because they are
45. See O'Connell, supra note 29, at 878; Owen, supra note 40, at 378-81;
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1321-26.
46. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just
Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 289 (1998).
47. Kirk A. Pasich, Bad Faith: The New Generation Weapon, in ABI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY; ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE: PAST PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 201, 213 (2002) (quoting Devlin v. Keamy Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault,
Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 381, 391, 202 Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (1984)), WL SG102
ALI-ABA 201, at *213 (2002).
48. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild":
Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003,
1023 (1999) (quoting Kenneth S. Abraham & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Punitive
Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 415, 417 (1989)).
49. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 312. For example, in Anderson v.
General Motors Corp., 537 U.S. 1053 (2002), General Motors designed the
Chevy Malibu's fuel system based upon its own cost-benefit analysis, which
though economically sound, resulted in severe physical and emotional injuries
to Patricia Anderson and her four children. O'Connell, supra note 29, at 874-
75.
50. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 314.
51. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1326-28.
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beyond the reach of the criminal law or public prosecutor.12 Further,
many misdeeds that can be criminally prosecuted are either done so
unsuccessfully or are not pursued at all.53 Without wealth-calibrated
punitive damages, corporations have an incentive to engage in
profitable, yet harmful behavior because they know that neither the
criminal nor the civil justice system will prevent it. Thus, punitive
damage awards that are adjusted to reflect the financial status of the
defendant fill the gaps left by the criminal law, deterring behavior
that would otherwise go undeterred.54
B. Punishment
A fundamental basis for punitive damages is to provide
retribution to the victim of an aggravated wrong.55 Punishment is
justified "in the sense that every wrong deserves to be punished.,
56
"The idea of imposing a judicial fine is viewed to be appropriate
insofar as it encourages the two most fundamental values of our legal
system-freedom and equality., 57 Consideration of a defendant's
wealth in determining the appropriate punitive damages award
furthers this goal of punishment.
58
Generally, evidence of a defendant's wealth is thought to be an
important consideration because of the conventional reasoning that it
52. Owen, supra note 40, at 380-81. This is because the practical
difficulties of prosecuting misconduct on the criminal side of the law, like
issues of cause-in-fact, the stringent procedural and evidentiary standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt and the more demanding evidentiary rules required
under the criminal law mean that few corporations will be criminally
prosecuted. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46. Another reason the criminal law
is so ineffectual in prosecuting corporate misconduct is that corporate
defendants hire teams of former white collar prosecutors to defend against
these actions. Id. at 313 n.105.
53. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 326-28. The Ford Pinto case is
"the only case in American history in which a corporation was criminally
prosecuted for knowingly marketing a dangerously defective product." Id. at
312-13. Ford was acquitted of the criminal charges. Id. The acquittal
discouraged other prosecutors from using the criminal law to punish
corporations. Id. Thus, punitive damages punished Ford; the criminal law did
not. Id.
54. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1326-28.
55. Owen, supra note 40, at 375.
56. O'Connell, supra note 29, at 877.
57. Id.; Owen, supra note 40, at 375.
58. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1318-20.
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takes more to punish a rich person than a poor one.59 This intuitively
correct assumption reflects the diminishing marginal utility of
money; that is, a dollar is generally thought to have more marginal
value to a poor person than a rich one. Thus, for an award of
punitive damages to "inflict the same amount of [punishment] upon a
rich person as a poor one, the law needs to deprive the rich person of
more dollars than the poor one."61 "[T]aking the defendant's wealth
into account is theoretically consistent with principles of fairness in
that it seeks to equilibrate the amount of disutility imposed., 62 From
this perspective, the defendant's wealth is extremely relevant in
determining the appropriate amount of a punitive damage award,• 63
especially in the context of retributive justice.
Furthermore, punitive damages assessed with reference to the
wealth of the defendant are also useful in punishing corporate
wrongdoing, which too often goes unpunished because of the great
power of large companies. 64 This punishment calibrated to reflect
the wealth of the defendant is necessary for two reasons: (1) the rich
are rarely criminally prosecuted; and, (2) in this context, punitive
damages can effectively punish impermissible cost-benefit
calculations, which trade consumer safety for profits.65
For example, in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,66 "punitive
damages punished Ford[;] [t]he criminal law did not."67 After "three
teenage girls died from burns when their 1973 Pinto was struck from
59. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 61 (1982); Owen, supra note 40, at 386.
60. Owen, supra note 40, at 386. This means that the harm suffered by a
poor person in losing one dollar is greater than the harm suffered by a rich
person in losing one dollar, even though the value of that dollar remains the
same. See Ellis, supra note 59, at 61.
61. Owen, supra note 40, at 386.
62. Ellis, supra note 59, at 61.
63. Owen, supra note 40, at 386.
64. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 304-05. "As Justice Louis
Brandeis warned: 'Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool
employed by individuals in the conduct of private business, have become an
institution-an institution which has brought such concentration of economic
power that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the
State."' Id. at 304-05 (quoting Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
65. Id. at 312-15.
66. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
67. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 312.
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behind... [a]n Indiana prosecutor charged Ford with three counts of
reckless homicide."6 8 Ford was acquitted of the criminal charges.69
The Ford Pinto litigation resulted in one of the few cases thus far in
which a corporation was criminally prosecuted based upon a
defective product.
7 °
While the Grimshaw court awarded $3.5 million in punitive
damages,7 the court's punishment would have been more effective if
it had been calibrated for wealth.72 According to an economic
analysis, ideal punishment should vary with the wealth of the
defendant.73 Thus, in Grimshaw, where Ford's net worth was $7.7
billion and the company earned more than two times the unadjusted
punitive damages award ($125 million) during the last quarter of the
year of appeal, the punitive damage award would have achieved
optimal punishment if it had been calibrated for Ford's wealth.
74
Punitive damages are imposed, in part, to punish defendants for
egregious misconduct. Punitive damages fail to perform this
important function "'if the wealth of the defendant allows him to
absorb the award with little or no discomfort."', 75 To ensure that a
wealthy defendant experiences more than just a pinprick, the
calculation of a punitive damages award must include consideration
of a defendant's financial condition.
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 771.
72. Peter Diamond, Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in
Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others, 18 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 117, 128 (2002). Holding other variables constant, Peter Diamond
explores how punitive damages should vary with wealth. Assuming ideal
punishment is proportional to wealth, Peter Diamond concludes that "no
additional conditions are needed for the conclusion that punitive damages
should increase with the wealth of the defendant." Id.
73. Id.
74. Rustad and Koenig, supra note 2, at 1314.
75. Pasich, supra note 47, at 213 (quoting Devlin v. Kearny Mesa
AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 381, 391 (1984)).
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IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT LEADING UP TO AND CULMINATING
IN STATE FARM v. CAMPBELL
A. Supreme Court Precedent Prior to State Farm v. Campbell
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the Supreme Court began to
identify constitutional constraints on punitive damages awards. In
these early cases, the Court expressed concerns that punitive damage
awards were "run[ning] wild,, 76 but fell short of imposing
constraints that would reduce punitive damages awards.
In two early cases, the Supreme Court for the first time noted
that the constitutionality of punitive damages raised "important
issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved., 77 In Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, the Court recognized that punitive
damages awards raise important constitutional questions.
78
Similarly, in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,79 Justice
O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, "expressed the view that
unrestricted jury discretion over punitive damages awards presented
'serious' procedural due process problems. ' s
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a punitive damages
award could not be challenged under the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment "does not
constrain an award of [punitive] damages in a civil suit."82 However,
the Court stated, "[t]here is some authority in our opinions for the
view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a
76. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
77. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986).
78. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately set aside the punitive damages award
on other grounds. Id.
79. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
80. Joseph J. Chambers, In re Exxon Valdez: Application of Due Process
Constraints on Punitive Damages Awards, 20 ALASKA L. REv. 195, 202
(2003) (discussing O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bankers Life). The
Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional issue in Bankers Life because
the issue had not been properly raised in the state court. Bankers Life, 486
U.S. at 76.
81. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
82. Id. The Court did not reach the question of whether the Due Process
Clause is a constraint on jury discretion over punitive damages even in the
absence of statutory limits also because this question was not properly raised in
the court below. Id. at 276-77.
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civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme."8 3 In a
concurrence, Justice Brennan emphasized that "the Due Process
Clause forbids damages awards that are 'grossly excessive' or 'so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense
and obviously unreasonable."' 84 The Court, in Browning-Ferris,
intimated that it would be willing to address the role the Due Process
Clause plays in limiting the size of punitive damage awards in the
future.
8 5
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,86 Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance brought a challenge to a punitive damage award based
on the Due Process Clause.87 The Supreme Court responded by
stating firmly that the Due Process Clause imposes a limit on
punitive damages awards.88  The Court endeavored to resolve
"whether the Due Process Clause render[ed] the punitive damages
award in [Pacific Mutual] constitutionally unacceptable." 89 Here, the
Court refused to draw a constitutional bright line between the
acceptable and unacceptable, but emphasized that "general concerns
of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court" are part of
the "constitutional calculus."
90
The Court also approved of seven factors used by the state to
determine "whether a punitive award is reasonably related to the
goals of deterrence and retribution." 91 Two of those factors were the
"profitability" and "'financial position' of the defendant. 92 The
Pacific Mutual Court "viewed wealth of the defendant as a key factor
in determining the reasonableness of a punitive award.
9 3
"The Court ultimately upheld the punitive damages award,
finding that the award had an 'understandable relationship to [the]
compensatory damages."' 94 Thus, in Pacific Mutual, the punitive
83. Id. at 276.
84. Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
85. See id. at 276-77.
86. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
87. See id. at 12.
88. See id. at 18-19; see also Chambers, supra note 80, at 202.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 21.
92. Id. at 22.
93. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1313.
94. Chambers, supra note 80, at 203 (discussing Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 22.)
The punitive damages award assessed against Pacific Mutual did not violate
1751
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1739
damages award, which was four times the amount of the
compensatory damages, may have been close to the line, but did "not
cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety.
' 95
Two years later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.,96 the Supreme Court "upheld the punitive damage award
while reiterating that 'reasonableness' is an important factor in
determining whether a punitive damages award is so 'grossly
excessive' that it violates the Due Process Clause." 97 The TXO Court
adopted the Pacific Mutual factors, including the defendant's
wealth.98 The Court recognized that "as 'a matter of fundamental
fairness, punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to
compensatory damages,"' but still upheld an award with a ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages of 526 to one.99 Because TXO's
conduct was malicious and fraudulent, the Court concluded the
disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award was not
controlling. 100 Together, these cases established the foundation for
the Court's decisions in Gore'
0 ' and State Farm.10 2
the Due Process Clause because the jury's discretion was confined by the state
policy concerns of deterrence and punishment and the trial court and Alabama
Supreme Court conducted a post-verdict hearing to ensure that the award was
not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense. Pac. Mut., 499
U.S. at 22-23.
95. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 23-24.
96. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
97. Chambers, supra note 80, at 203 (discussing TXO, 509 U.S. at 453,
458).
98. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462. ("The punitive damages award in this case is
certainly large, but in light of the ... petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded
that the award was so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of the
State to allow.").
99. Id. at 459 (citing Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909
(1991)).
100. Id. at 462.
101. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
102. The Supreme Court also considered, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415 (1994), whether a state's decision to prevent review by courts of
punitive damages awards violated Due Process. The Court held that an Oregon
law denying its courts the authority to reduce or vacate excessive punitive
damages awards violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 435-35. The Court
stated that "[j]udicial review of the size of punitive damages awards has been a
safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been
awarded." Id. at 421.
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B. BMW of North America v. Gore
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,10 3 the Supreme Court
held that the amount of the punitive damages award in that case
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
°4
The Gore Court stated, "[o]nly when an award can fairly be
categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to [a state's] interests
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause."' 05  "The majority opinion articulated the following three
guideposts to be considered when a court determines whether a
punitive damages award is constitutionally excessive: (1) the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio of the award
to the harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and (3) the difference between
the award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed
for comparable conduct."'1 6 After it applied the guideposts to the
facts, the Court found the punitive award grossly excessive in
relation to the state's legitimate interests and remanded the case to
the Alabama Supreme Court. 10 7 Gore was the first time the Supreme
Court applied its analysis to invalidate an "excessive" award on due
process grounds.108 Furthermore, in Gore, the Court emphasized the
three guideposts, while de-emphasizing other previously considered
factors like the profitability and financial status of the defendant.1
0 9
C. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
State Farm was the first case to apply the Gore guideposts and
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to further limit the
role the wealth of the defendant would be allowed to play in the
punitive damages award calculus.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme
Court's punitive damages award of $145 million on the ground that it
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
0
103. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
104. Id.; see also Chambers, supra note 80, at 204 (discussing Gore, 517
U.S. at 574-75).
105. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
106. Chambers, supra note 80, at 204 (discussing Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75).
107. Id. (discussing Gore, 517 U.S. at 585-86).
108. See Pohlman, supra note 20, at 644-48
109. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-86.
110. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1526 (2003).
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The Supreme Court, in its analysis, made clear the relative
importance of each of the three guideposts in evaluating a punitive
damages award for excessiveness.
111
While the Supreme Court did not specifically proscribe
consideration by lower courts of some other factors, the Court did
severely limit the use of one factor in particular: the financial status
of the defendant. 112 The Court stated that the wealth of the defendant
still could be a relevant factor, but, so restricted its relevance that it
only could be used in situations where an award must be lowered
because it threatens to bankrupt a defendant." 3 This section of the
Article reviews the facts behind State Farm, the Court's application
and analysis of the three Gore guideposts, and finally, discusses the
State Farm .Court's ban on the use of defendant's wealth to increase
an award of punitive damages.
1. Facts of the Case
In 1981, Mr. Campbell was driving with his wife as passenger
down a two-lane highway in Utah when he began passing six vans
traveling in front of him. 1 4 Todd Ospital was the driver of a car
approaching from the opposite direction.1l 5 To avoid a head-on
collision with Campbell, Ospital swerved, lost control of his vehicle
and collided with another vehicle driven by Robert Slusher.
116
Ospital was killed, Slusher was permanently disabled, and the
Campbells escaped unharmed.117
Although investigators reached an early consensus that Mr.
Campbell's unsafe pass had caused the crash, Campbell's insurer,
State Farm Automobile Insurance ("State Farm"), decided to contest
liability and rejected offers to settle for the policy limit of $50,000.'18
State Farm took the case to trial, assuring the Campbells that, "'their
assets were safe, that they had no liability for the accident, that [State
Farm] would represent their interests, and that they did not need to
111. See id. at 1520-26.
112. See id. at 1525.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 1517.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1517-18.
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procure separate counsel."" 19 A jury determined that Campbell was
100 percent at fault and returned a judgment for $186,849. 120 State
Farm refused to cover the $135,849 in excess liability, telling the
Campbells, "'[y]ou may want to put [a] for sale sign... on your
property to get things moving."'
' 121
Campbell obtained his own counsel and appealed the
judgment.12 2 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and
State Farm finally paid the entire $186,849. 123 Nonetheless, the
Campbells "filed a complaint against State Farm alleging bad faith,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress." 124 The trial
was bifurcated at State Farm's request and "[i]n the first phase [of
trial,] the jury determined that State Farm's decision not to settle was
unreasonable."'
125
In the second phase, the Campbells introduced evidence of State
Farm's business practices in numerous states showing a pattern of
dishonest and fraudulent nation-wide claims adjustment, which was
orchestrated from the highest levels of corporate management.
126
The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive damages. 127 The trial court
reduced the award to $1 million and $25 million respectively.
128
Both parties appealed and the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the
$145 million punitive damages award. 129 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 1
30
119. Id. at 1518 (quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65
P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003)).
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1142).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1518-19. "'State Farm's decision to take the [Campbells'] case to
trial was a result of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping
payouts on claims company wide."' Id. at 1519 (quoting Campbell, 65 P.3d at
1143). The trial court allowed the Campbells to introduce expert evidence
proving the existence of the scheme because it was necessary to determine
whether State Farm's conduct was "'intentional and sufficiently egregious to
warrant punitive damages."' Id. at 1519 (quoting Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1143).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Utah Supreme Court relied upon State Farm's "'massive
wealth,"' and the low probability of State Farm being punished in other cases
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2. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in State Farm
The Supreme Court, applying the principles outlined in BMW v.
Gore, concluded it -was error to reinstate the jury's $145 million
punitive damages award. 13 1 Gore established three guideposts for
determining the reasonableness and proportionality of an award of
punitive damages: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded
by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.' 32
Citing Gore, the Court noted, "'[t]he most important indicium of
the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."" 33 The Gore Court
instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct by considering the following factors: (1) whether the harm
caused was physical as opposed to economic; (2) whether the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard for
the health or safety of others; (3) whether the target of conduct had
financial vulnerability; (4) whether the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) whether the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
134
Punitive damages should only be awarded if a defendant's actions
are so reprehensible that compensatory damages alone cannot
achieve punishment or deterrence.
135
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that State Farm's
actions "merit. . * no praise,"' 36 the Court nonetheless concluded, "a
more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have
satisfied the State's legitimate objectives."' 137 The Court dismissed
and concluded the $145 million punitive damages award was not excessive.
Id. (quoting Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1153).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1521.
132. Id. at 1520 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575
(1996)).
133. Id. at 1521 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
134. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576, 577).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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evidence of State Farm's out-of-state conduct as "tangential,"
stressing that the Utah Supreme Court overstepped the bounds of due
process in considering this conduct.1 38 Thus, "the only conduct
relevant to the reprehensibility analysis" was the conduct that
harmed the Campbells.139 This conduct, according to the Court, did
not warrant a punitive damages award of $145 million.
140
Turning to the second Gore guidepost, the Court declined to
impose a bright line ratio. However, the Court stressed that
"courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both
reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the
plaintiff.' 42 Usually, this means that few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio will satisfy due process.' 43 The Court concluded there is a
presumption against an award that has a 145:1 ratio, since the
compensatory award was substantial. 144
"The Utah Supreme Court sought to justify the.., award by
pointing to State Farm's... failure to report a prior $100 million
punitive damages award... to its corporate headquarters... and
State Farm's enormous wealth. 145 According to the Court, the prior
punitive damages award was only marginally relevant and "should
have been accorded little or no weight., 146 As for the wealth of the
defendant, the Supreme Court indicated it "cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.' 47 Reference to
State Farm's assets, according to the Court, "had little to do with the
actual harm sustained by the Campbells.
1 48
The Court did not dwell on the third guidepost, pointing out the
most relevant civil sanction in Utah was a $10,000 fine, a much
smaller amount than the $145 million punitive damages award.1
49
138. Id. at 1523.
139. Id. at 1524.
140. See id. at 1521.
141. Id. at 1524.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1525.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1526.
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3. Impact of State Farm
After State Farm, the wealth of the defendant is no longer
relevant to increase the amount of a punitive damages award. The
Court says wealth cannot compensate for the failure of the other
factors to constrain significantly an award of punitive damages.
150
While on its face, State Farm seems to recognize wealth as a factor,
it really only considers it viable as a means of lowering an award
threatening to bankrupt a defendant.
The State Farm Court exposes its opposition to using a
defendant's wealth to increase an award of punitive damages when it
acknowledges that "the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net
worth" may result in juries using their verdicts to "express biases"
against wealthy defendants.' 51 The Court seems to assume that
juries, when confronted with evidence of a defendant's wealth, "will
be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or whim."'
152
According to the State Farm Court, it was in light of this assumption
that the Gore Court announced the three guideposts.
53
The State Farm Court not only expressed concern about the due
process implications of the hypothetical use of defendant's wealth to
inflate a punitive award, but also disapproved of the actual use of
State Farm's net worth by the Utah Supreme Court.'5 4 The Utah
Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive award, in part
because State Farm had already disregarded a smaller award, was
rarely punished, and was enormously wealthy. 55 The State Farm
Court labeled the Utah Supreme Court's analysis "a departure from
well-established constraints on punitive damages."' 56  Thus,
according to the State Farm Court, using the financial status of the
defendant to inflate a punitive damages award both conflicts with
and departs from the appropriate due process analysis.
The State Farm Court implied that wealth can still be a relevant
factor, but this relevance seems illusive. In cases where the
defendant is very wealthy, an award of punitive damages only could
150. Id. at 1525.
151. Id. at 1520.
152. Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991)).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1520-21.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1525.
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be large if the defendant's conduct was especially reprehensible,
there was a reasonable ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages and a reasonable relationship between punitive damages
and civil penalties.1 57 But, this would be the same without regard for
the defendant's wealth. In fact, under these circumstances, it seems
that the only time wealth would be relevant would be to reduce an
award that threatens to bankrupt a poor defendant.
Conversely, according to the Court in State Farm, in cases
where the conduct is not highly reprehensible and/or the
compensatory damages are low, the defendant's wealth could not be
used to increase the award of punitive damages because a large
award in this context would be unconstitutional. 158  Thus, a
defendant's financial status remains a relevant factor, if at all, in
cases where though the defendant's conduct may be reprehensible,
the defendant's poverty makes imposition of a large punitive
damages award unnecessary to achieve punishment and deterrence.
Thus, while the State Farm Court gives lip service to two of the
goals of punitive damages, punishment and deterrence, it forecloses
the use of evidence of the defendant's wealth to achieve either
objective.
V. STATE FARM IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY AND GOALS OF
PUNITIvE DAMAGES
A. History of Punitive Damages
Over the centuries, juries or judges have considered a
defendant's wealth in determining the appropriate punitive damages
award. 159 Moreover, nearly every American jurisdiction that has
recognized punitive damages has permitted evidence of financial
standing to be considered in order to ensure that the award is large
enough. 160 The Supreme Court, in Haslip, viewed wealth as a key
factor in determining the reasonableness of a punitive award. Yet,
the State Farm Court has broken with this long tradition. By holding
that plaintiffs may not use the defendant's wealth in arguing for a
157. Id. at 1520.
158. Id. at 1524.
159. See supra Part II.
160. Annotation, supra note 3, § 1.
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higher punitive damages award, the State Farm Court has moved
away not only from its own precedent, but also from a long history
and tradition of considering defendant's wealth. In doing so, the
State Farm Court has taken a step in the wrong direction.
B. Punishment and Deterrence
1. Punishment
A key goal of punitive damages is to provide retribution to the
victim of an aggravated wrong. 161 Evidence of a defendant's wealth
must be considered because an award that could bankrupt a poor
defendant may be little more than a pinprick to a wealthy one.
162
The State Farm Court's determination that a defendant's wealth
cannot be used to inflate a punitive damages award results not only
in minimal punishment in State Farm, but minimal punishment in all
future punitive damages cases.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court discredited the Utah Supreme
Court's reliance upon evidence of State Farm's enormous wealth and
the fact that State Farm's actions rarely will be punished. 163 In doing
so, the Supreme Court failed to punish State Farm. Because of the
diminishing marginal utility of money, an award of punitive damages
will punish defendants differently, based upon their wealth. Like
Ford,164 State Farm likely was not punished by the reduced punitive
damages award because of its enormous wealth. 16  Thus, the State
Farm Court's exclusion of defendant's wealth as a means of
increasing a punitive damages award is inconsistent with achieving
punishment.
161. See supra Part III.B.
162. Id.
163. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525-26.
164. See discussion supra Part III.B.
165. James E. Wilson, Jr., Punitive Damages: The U.S. Supreme Court's
State Farm v. Campbell Decision: What About Deterrence?, NEV. LAW. Sept.
2003, at 8, 11. State Farm disregarded a previous punitive damages award of
one million dollars. Id. To break even on such an award, State Farm need
only make $20 per bad act. Id. State Farm could hardly feel the sting of
punishment from a punitive damages award of this size. Id.
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2. Deterrence
If the defendant's financial status is not a factor, then judges and
juries will be unable to effectively deter the wrongdoer and others
from engaging in reprehensible conduct.' 66 The State Farm Court
limits the punitive damages award assessment to the three Gore
guideposts.167  While this Article does not address the specific
failures of the Gore guideposts, it should be noted that by excluding
consideration of a defendant's wealth and relying on the Gore
guideposts, the Supreme Court has minimized punitive damages'
deterrent effect. 1
68
The Supreme Court described the first Gore guidepost, the
degree of reprehensibility, as the most important factor in evaluating
a punitive damages award. 169  Careful analysis of the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct is an important starting
point for achieving deterrence; however, this guidepost alone is
insufficient. For example, a uniform penalty levied for equally
reprehensible acts committed both by a poor defendant and a wealthy
one "will trigger different levels of deterrence."'17 1 "A one thousand
dollar [punitive] award might greatly deter a poor defendant, but
barely concern a wealthy one."'
172
Moreover, the second Gore factor, the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages, may in some circumstances actually
undermine the deterrent effect of punitive damages. 173  This is
because the ratio factor "stress[es] the actual resultant harm rather
than the social undesirability of the defendant's conduct."' 174 The
problem with this approach "is that the actual injury sustained may
166. See supra Part II.B.
167. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520; Lisa M. Broman, Comment,
Punitive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 NEB. L. REv. 651 (1982).
168. See Diamond, supra note 72; Pasich, supra note 47; Wilson, supra note
165;
169. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521; Casenote, Bridget E. Leonard, State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell: Refining BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore and Further Restricting Punitive Damages, 38 U. RICH.
L. REv. 545, 549 (2004).
170. See Broman, supra note 167, at 661.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at676.
174. Id.
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bear little relationship, if any, to the amount of an award which
would be an effective deterrent.,
175
In addition, if, as the Supreme Court suggests in State Farm, the
ratio is limited to single-digit multipliers, then the deterrent effect of
an award of punitive damages is further minimized. 176 For example,
if a jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages against a wealthy
defendant, a $9,000 award of punitive damages (the maximum
punitive award allowable if the ratio is limited to a single-digit ratio)
"probably would not have any meaningful impact., 177 Because the
amount of punitive damages, which will serve as an example to the
defendant and others will necessarily vary widely, a rigid ratio
formula would fail in many instances to achieve deterrence.1
7 8
Furthermore, the third Gore factor requires a comparison of the
punitive damages award to civil and criminal sanctions for
comparable misconduct. 179  This guidepost provides jurors and
reviewing courts with little guidance, especially since for some
misconduct, a civil or criminal sanction may have no relation to the
appropriate punitive damages award.1
80
In addition, in State Farm, the punitive damages award failed
not only to deter State Farm's reprehensible conduct, but also to
deter other corporate defendants from engaging in similarly
reprehensible conduct. The majority opinion in State Farm, in over-
turning a punitive damages award of $145 million, discredited the
Utah Supreme Court's reliance on evidence that State Farm's
corporate headquarters was not informed of a prior punitive damages
award of $100 million.' 8 ' The Court also ignored evidence that State
Farm's actions "will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000
cases as a matter of statistical probability."'
182
If a $100 million punitive damages award was not even reported
to State Farm's home office, then it is fair to infer that it will take
175. Id.
176. Pasich, supra note 47, at 213.
177. Id. at 212.
178. Id.
179. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996).
180. See Pasich, supra note 47, at 212-13.
181. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1525
(2003); Wilson, supra note 165, at 11.
182. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.
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something more than $100 million to get State Farm's attention.'
83
Yet, by placing the financial status of the defendant off limits as a
factor for consideration in increasing a punitive damages award, the
State Farm Court is in actuality not only failing to deter State Farm's
reprehensible conduct, but also sending a message to State Farm and
other wealthy corporations that punitive damages are merely a cost
of doing business. 184 As long as the profit exceeds the cost, wealthy
defendants have an economic incentive to commit reprehensible
fraudulent conduct. 185 Thus, the State Farm Court's decision to
prevent fact-finders from using wealth to increase a punitive
damages award prevents deterrence.
C. Juries Do Not Use Evidence of a Defendant's Wealth Improperly
as Suggested by the Supreme Court in State Farm
The State Farm Court suggests, and many critics of punitive
damages argue, that evidence of a defendant's wealth "'provides an
open-ended basis for inflating [punitive damages] awards."",186 Some
critics complain juries are consistently biased against wealthy
defendants and that presenting evidence of a defendant's financial
condition creates a "Robin Hood like state of mind in the jury
room.'187 While the possibility that juries might use a defendant's
wealth improperly is a valid concern, in practice, social
psychological research finds no evidence that juries are unfavorably
disposed towards wealthy defendants.
183. Id. at 1525.
184. Pasich, supra note 47, at 213.
185. Wilson, Jr., supra note 165, at 11.
186. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
187. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 337. One study conducted by
David Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass Sunstein (Sunstein study), found
that conduct deemed to be equally reprehensible resulted in a larger punitive
damages award when the defendant was wealthy than when the defendant was
poor. David Kahneman, David A. Schkade, & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared
Outrage, Erratic Awards, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
How JURIES DECIDE, 31, 40-42 (2002). However, the Sunstein study
concluded that jury awards were so erratic, not because jurors were given
evidence of the defendant's wealth, but because "'jurors lack an understanding
of how to choose one or another point along [a] literally infinite scale." 1d.
Thus, according to the Sunstein study, jurors are in need of "guidance about
the meaning or consequences of different choices on the unbounded dollar
scale." Id. With that guidance, jurors would be able to use a defendant's
wealth appropriately.
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For example, one study concluded that jurors actually harbored
suspicions about the validity-of plaintiffs' claims and worried about
the social cost of large jury awards.' 88  Moreover, RAND
investigated the widely held view that jurors are biased against
wealthy "deep pocket" defendants with jury simulations. Its study is
consistent with other empirical research 189 in casting doubt on the
deep-pocket hypothesis.190
Furthermore, a secondary analysis of million dollar punitive
damage awards upheld in federal courts between 1984 and 1994
conducted by Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad revealed that
most wealthy defendants "were punished only slightly in view of
their size and the gravity of their offense."'19' The study concluded
that "improper references to the wealth of the defendant were not an
issue in these cases. In fact, in the full decade examined, no federal
appeals court cited has reduced an award because of a plaintiff's
improper references to the defendant's wealth.' 92  Thus, the
Supreme Court and critics' concerns over juror's use of defendant's
wealth is unfounded; "wealth-calibrated punitive damages are not out
of control."'
193
VI. MATHIAS v. A CCOR ECONOMY LODGING, INC.
The Seventh Circuit in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging,
Inc.194 interpreted State Farm to mean that the wealth of the
defendant could be used to inflate a punitive damages award in
limited circumstances. 95 In Mathias, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
decision to award an amount of punitive damages in a case brought
by hotel guests who were bitten by bedbugs while staying in a Motel
6 in downtown Chicago.196 The majority opinion, authored by Judge
188. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46,. at 337-38.
189. See Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate
Defendants by Juries: An ,Examination of the Deep Pockets Hypothesis, 30
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 121, 140-44 (1996) (concluding that there is little
evidence that a defendant's wealth affects juror judgments).
190. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 46, at 338-39.
191. Id. at 340-41.
192. Id. at 342.
193. Id.
194. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003)
195. Id. at 676.
196. Id. at 673, 678.
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Posner, concluded that the wealth of the defendant is relevant in
cases where the defendant's resources enable the defendant to mount
an aggressive defense, and the plaintiff's actual damages are low.
97
Under these circumstances, a wealthy defendant can make litigation
very costly for the plaintiff making it hard for the plaintiff to find a
lawyer willing to take the case on a contingency fee basis.198 Judge
Posner argues that consideration of the wealth of the defendant, in
this context, may warrant a punitive damages award exceeding the
single-digit punitive to compensatory ratio suggested in State
Farm.
199
A- Facts
The plaintiffs brought suit against Accor Economy Lodging, the
affiliated entities that own and operate the "Motel 6" chain of hotels
and motels. 200 They were guests in a motel owned by defendants and
were bitten by bedbugs while in their hotel room.20 1 The plaintiffs
claimed that allowing guests to be attacked by bedbugs while
charging more than it could have charged had it informed the guests
of the risks of being bitten by bedbugs constituted willful and wanton
conduct, making Accor liable for both compensatory and punitive
damages. 20 2 The jury agreed and awarded each plaintiff $5,000 in
compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages.20 3 Accor
appealed, arguing the plaintiffs were not entitled to any award of
punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages awarded
plaintiffs was excessive, depriving Accor of property without due
process of the law.2 °4
B. Judge Posner's Reasoning in Mathias
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the evidence offered at trial and
concluded there was sufficient evidence of willful and wanton
conduct to warrant an award of punitive damages in the case. 0 5
197. Id. at 677.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 673.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 674.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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Next, the Court had to determine whether the amount of punitive
damages awarded below violated the due process fights of Accor.
Accor argued for an award of $20,000 in punitive damages, a ratio of
four to one, based on the Supreme Court's suggestion in State Farm
v. Campbell that a ratio of four to one between punitive and
compensatory damages "might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety., 20 6 However, Judge Posner disagreed with Accor; the
Supreme Court did not establish a mandatory four to one ratio.20 7
Judge Posner emphasized the need to consider two questions in
deciding whether the amount of the punitive damage award should
be upheld: "why punitive damages are awarded and why the Court
has decided that due process requires that such awards be limited. 20 8
Judge Posner answered the first question in terms of the present case;
where the compensable harm done was slight and at the same time
difficult to quantify because largely emotional, without punitive
damages, the defendant may continue his outrageous behavior with
impunity.20 9 Thus, the punitive damages award serves to punish the
defendant, to deter future conduct and to limit the defendant's ability
to profit from its outrageous behavior.
In answer to the second question of why the Court had decided
Due Process requires limited awards, Judge Posner emphasized the
penal nature of punitive damages--"the punishment should fit the
crime.,2 10  He also pointed out that "a defendant should have
reasonable notice of the sanction for unlawful acts [and]...
sanctions should be based on the wrong done, not the status of the
defendant.211
However, Judge Posner indicates that the wealth or status of the
defendant can, in certain circumstances, be relevant to a
determination of the amount of punitive damages. If a wealthy
defendant is "investing in developing a reputation intended to deter
plaintiffs" from pursuing legitimate claims, then a larger award of
punitive damages may be justified to allow plaintiffs to finance the
206. Id. at 676.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 677.
210. Id. at 676.
211. Id.
1766
Summer 2004] WEALTH-CALIBRATED PUNITIVE DAMAGES
suit.212 Accor demonstrated "great stubbornness [in its defense of
this case], making a host of frivolous evidentiary arguments despite
the very modest stakes." 213 As a result, Judge Posner considered
Accor's net worth of $1.6 billion relevant in his determination that
the award of punitive damages in this case was not excessive.
21 4
C. Mathias is Inconsistent with State Farm
Judge Posner's suggestion that evidence of wealth may be
relevant in certain narrow circumstances is inconsistent with State
Farm. In State Farm, the Court specifically forecloses the use of
evidence of wealth in a case where compensatory damages are low,
the type of case where Judge Posner thinks evidence of wealth may
be relevant.
According to State Farm, where an act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages, a larger award could be justified
by the extreme reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, but not
by evidence of the defendant's wealth. 21 5 Although the amount of
the punitive award in Mathias takes into account the reprehensibility
of Accor's conduct, the size of the award is in large part justified by
Accor's $1.6 billion net worth, which enables Accor to make it very
costly for any plaintiff to bring suit.216 The State Farm Court made it
clear that the defendant's wealth "cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award. 217  In direct contrast,
Judge Posner uses the defendant's wealth to justify an award that
would otherwise be unconstitutional.218
212. Id. at 677.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524
(2003).
216. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677.
217. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
218. The punitive to compensatory ratio of the award upheld in Mathias is
37.2 to 1. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676. The State Farm Court, though declining
to set a mathematical bright-line ratio, authoritatively established that "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio ... will satisfy due process." State Fann,
123 S. Ct. at 1524. Thus, the 37.2 to 1 ratio of the award in Mathias would
likely be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court's standards.
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VII. MATHIAS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY AND GOALS OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
A. Mathias is Consistent with the History of Punitive Damages
Judge Posner's recognition that the defendant's wealth can, in
certain circumstances, play an important role in the punitive damages
219assessment is consistent with the long history of punitive damages.
The vast majority of American courts that have considered the issue
have concluded that the defendant's wealth is an appropriate
consideration.220 Judge Posner came to the same conclusion in
Mathias when he determined that the punitive damages award
assessed against the defendant is appropriate because the plaintiff's
compensatory damages are small and a larger punitive award is
necessary to punish and deter the wealthy defendant. 221 Thus, the
result reached by Judge Posner, unlike that reached by the Supreme
Court in State Farm, appropriately recognizes the important role the
defendant's wealth has played throughout the history of punitive
damages.
B. Mathias is Consistent with Punishment and Deterrence
1. Punishment
Punishment is one of the main goals of punitive damages;
allowing for consideration of a defendant's wealth in increasing a
punitive damages award enables courts to achieve this goal.222 Judge
Posner's opinion in Mathias recognizes that punishment cannot be
achieved without consideration of a defendant's wealth. In Mathias,
a small punitive damages award would enable the hotel chain to
commit wrongdoing with impunity. After all, a small punitive award
could hardly cause the defendant, whose net worth was $1.6
billion,223 to suffer any discomfort. Judge Posner acknowledged this
fact in upholding the punitive damages award in Mathias.
219. See supra Part II.
220. Annotation, supra note 3.
221. Mathias,347 F.3d at 676-78.
222. See supra Part III.B.
223. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677.
1768
Summer 2004] WEALTH-CALIBRATED PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In addition, Judge Posner's opinion is consistent with the goal of
punishing impermissible cost-benefit calculations through a wealth-
calibrated punitive damages award. In Mathias, Accor weighed the
cost of closing the hotel for a thorough fumigation against the cost of
refunds to unhappy customers and decided it would be less expensive
to rent rooms in an unsanitary condition than to rectify the
problem.224 Judge Posner determined that a smaller punitive award
(such as $20,000 or four times the amount of compensatory
damages) would not have effectively punished Accor's cost-benefit
calculation.225 Thus, unlike the State Farm Court, Judge Posner was
able to achieve the appropriate level of punishment through
consideration of Accor's wealth.
2. Deterrence
Judge Posner's decision in Mathias is consistent with deterrence
even more so than it is with retribution. Inherent in Judge Posner's
reasoning is the recognition that a wealthier defendant will not be
deterred at all by a punitive damages award that is not calibrated for
wealth. In fact a small punitive damages award may even have the
opposite effect. In Mathias, for example, a small punitive damages
award would not only have allowed Accor to profit from its
misconduct, but also sent a message to other plaintiffs that bringing
suit against this defendant would be very costly.
226
Mathias, in using Accor's wealth to justify the punitive damages
award, succeeds at deterring Accor and other defendants. The
wealth-calibrated punitive damages award in Mathias effectively
deterred Accor from similar conduct in the future by taking the profit
out of Accor's misconduct and making Accor aware that it could
face a large punitive award despite only a small compensatory
award. Moreover, Mathias deterred other wealthy defendants by
making it clear that misconduct that trades profits for safety will not
be tolerated. Thus, by creating a place for the defendant's wealth in
the punitive damages calculus, Judge Posner has furthered punitive
damages' goal of deterrence.
224. Id. at 674, 677.
225. See id. at 676-78.
226. See id. at 677.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The future role of punitive damages is unsure. After State
Farm, punitive damages awards cannot effectively achieve either of
the twin goals of punitive damages: punishment and deterrence.
Judge Posner's recognition of one circumstance where wealth-
calibrated punitive damages are needed to prevent abuses by wealthy
defendants is an indication of the direction that punitive damages
should be taking.
Wealth-based punitive damages should be allowed to play the
crucial role they were intended to play, punishing and deterring
social deviance. The Supreme Court overlooked the long history and
substantial precedent supporting the use of wealth-calibrated punitive
damages. Judge Posner's decision in Mathias recognizes that the
history and precedent behind punitive damages not only supports
wealth-calibrated punitive damages, but requires them. If punitive
damages are going to continue to function, as they have for centuries,
to effectively punish and deter reprehensible misconduct, then the
defendant's wealth must be a factor in the punitive damages calculus.
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